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What drives rural out-migration? Insights from Kosovo 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Drawing on household, network and relative deprivation models of migration, 
this paper empirically tests the probability to migrate utilising data for agricultural 
households in Kosovo (circa 13,500 observations). We identify the determinants 
of the propensity to migrate and length of migration in the previous year, 
considering gender related differences. The results reveal the significance of 
household / personal characteristics, farm characteristics, and network effects on 
the propensity to migrate and length of migration in the previous year. However, 
we find no significant effect of relative deprivation on the propensity to migrate 
and length of migration. While education has a strong, positive effect on 
migration by women, this is not the case for men. Unprofitability and a lack of 
inputs, manpower and equipment, causing farmland to be left uncultivated, also 
stimulate out-migration. 
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Introduction 
 
Rising levels of domestic and international migration, in absolute if not relative terms 
(Czaika & de Haas, 2014), characterize contemporary societies with the International 
Organization for Migration (2018) estimating that in 2017 there were 257.7 million 
international migrants. This was a 63 per cent increase compared with 1990, which in 
turn was double the figure recorded in 1980. In the European Union (EU), permanent 
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legal migration from outside the EU is now equivalent to what is recorded in the United 
States, i.e. about one million a year. Within Europe, out-migration has been highest 
from the poorest regions and countries in the east and south of the region, most of which 
were previously governed by socialist / communist regimes (OECD, 2015). Rural areas, 
that are most reliant on agriculture as a source of income and employment, have been 
particularly affected as they suffer from structural underdevelopment and a lack 
alternative, non-farm job opportunities (GVG, 2012; International Organization for 
Migration, 2018).  
 
Out-migration can have a considerable and negative impact on rural 
communities. For instance, the disappearance of smaller family farms in the USA 
resulted in the decline or even death of some rural towns and communities (Moore, 
2001). Research in Moldova documents villages where over half of school aged 
children have at least one parent working abroad with their care left to grandparents or 
other relatives (Cash, 2015). This is an unfortunate situation, with a social cost, 
particularly in terms of the educational achievement and emotional welfare of children 
left behind by migrants (Parreñas, 2001). Migration also may adversely affect 
agricultural output and efficiency (Atamanov & Van den Berg, 2012; Rozelle, Taylor, 
& deBrauw, 1999), particularly in the absence of perfect substitutes for lost household 
labor. Previous research for Kosovo established that rural out-migration negatively 
impacts on farm technical efficiency (Sauer, Gorton, & Davidova, 2015), an effect 
amplified for households with better educated adult males.  
 
Against this backdrop, Kosovo is an interesting case study. Kosovo’s population 
appears to be very mobile considering both international and domestic migration. 
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According to the World Bank (2011), Kosovo’s international migration is one of the 
highest in the world, since every third or fourth household has at least one member 
living and working abroad. The largest flow of migrants (forced ones) occurred during 
the armed conflict in the late 1990s. Half of the two million then residents of Kosovo 
were refugees or internally displaced (Vathi & Black, 2007). The armed conflict also 
intensified rural-urban migration as its effect on the destruction of houses was greater 
in rural areas. 
 
However, migration continued in the post-conflict period with official estimates 
suggesting that 27 per cent of migrants left Kosovo during peaceful times (Gashi & 
Haxhikadrija, 2012), with the rural population continuing to decline (GVG, 2012). 
Migration out of rural areas is much higher (in terms of the percentage of the 
population) than for urban areas (Vathi & Black, 2007), reflecting the pull of greater 
and better paid employment opportunities elsewhere. Some rural migrants relocate to 
urban areas, particularly the capital Pristina, while others work abroad.  One of the 
reasons for the latter is that while the armed conflict ended officially in 1999, Kosovo 
remains beset by political instability and weak public institutions. For instance, the 
Corruption Perceptions Index, which orders countries based on how corrupt a country’s 
public sector is perceived to be, ranks Kosovo at 103rd place out of 168 countries 
(Transparency International, 2015). Instead of improving, the situation in Kosovo has 
deteriorated (World Bank, 2017). Applying the framework of voice, loyalty and exit, 
Möllers, Arapi-Gjini, Herzfeld, and Xhema (2017) found that recent international out-
migration (exit) has mainly been driven by dissatisfaction with the political system. For 
example, the general elections in mid-2014 led to a protracted political-constitutional 
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crisis, with 5 per cent of Kosovo’s population migrating to the EU during a “winter of 
discontent” in 2014/15 (The World Bank Group in Kosovo, 2015). 
 
Given this context, the paper addresses the research question – what are the 
determinants of rural out-migration? To answer the question, the analysis draws on a 
unique dataset, which combines very detailed household information with extensive 
income and farm production data. Due to the large scale of migration, the importance 
of remittances to Kosovo in terms of economic development and poverty alleviation 
has been studied extensively (e.g. Havolli, 2011; Möllers & Meyer, 2014; Möllers, 
Meyer, Xhema, & Buchenrieder, 2013). However, little work rigorously analyzes the 
propensity to migrate out of rural areas. The study draws on individual, household, 
network and relative deprivation models of migration, testing the extent to which the 
propositions formulated on the basis of these models hold for Kosovo. The remainder 
of this section provides important contextual information before considering the wider 
academic literature on determinants of migration. 
 
Poverty in Kosovo is widespread. The World Bank Group in Kosovo (2015) 
estimates that the average per capita income is about one-tenth of the EU level, with 
poverty rates of 80 per cent if the threshold of USD 5 per day is applied (at Purchasing 
Power Parity). Kosovo’s Agency of Statistics (ASK), applying a poverty line of €1.72 
per day, classifies 29.7 per cent of the population as poor. Poverty rates are higher in 
rural Kosovo (Macours & Swinnen, 2008), which remains heavily dependent on 
agriculture. Agricultural land ownership and management is extremely fragmented. For 
example, agricultural census data reveal that the average size of agricultural holding is 
3.2 hectares (ha), with the majority of holdings smaller than 1 ha (ASK, 2015). Such a 
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fragmented farm structure is common to other Western Balkan countries (Volk, 
Rednak, & Erjavec, 2012), with rural households struggling to generate reasonable 
incomes without recourse to other gainful activities outside of agriculture. However, 
several barriers to engagement in off-farm employment exist for Kosovo’s rural 
households. These include the shortage of salaried positions (Osmani, Gorton, & White, 
2013), with approximately 35 per cent of the workforce unemployed (UNDP, 2016). 
Another reason is that the access to roads, measured in kilometres per 1,000 persons, is 
worse than in comparator countries - Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia – and 
there is under-investment in road maintenance which often hinders commuting to urban 
areas (IMF, 2016). Under these circumstances, migration to larger cities and abroad is 
often a preferred livelihood strategy.  
 
 
Determinants of Out-migration 
 
The literature emphasizes the importance of individual characteristics (Germenji & 
Swinnen, 2005; Hatton & Williamson, 2005), household decision-making (Stark & 
Bloom, 1985), networks (Taylor, Rozelle, & de Brauw, 2003), and relative as well as 
absolute differentials in expected earnings (Massey et al., 1993) as motivators for 
migration. Each of these are reviewed in turn. 
 
 
Individual characteristics 
 
Neoclassical models treat migration as an outcome of a cost-benefit analysis conducted 
by individuals (Harris & Todaro, 1970), whereby workers compare the differential in 
incomes between destination and existing locations, and the costs involved in migration 
(transport, documentation, risks of being deported if undocumented etc.). Hatton and 
Williamson (2005) express this as: 
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𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 =  𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 > − 𝑐𝑐 > 0                                              (1) 
 
So that the decision of individual i to migrate from home (h) to a foreign (f) destination 
is a function of the differential in earnings � 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑖𝑖�,  zi is the individual’s 
compensating differential in favor of h, and c is the direct cost of migration. This 
assumes that individuals possess a preference (zi) in favor of remaining in their current 
location, reflecting the psychological costs of relocation (Massey, et al., 1993). The 
differential in wages depends on whether the returns to skills are greater in the 
destination relative to current location. If interpreted as present values, it is expected 
that the likelihood of migration declines as individual i ages and their remaining 
working life shortens.  
 
Empirical research suggests that age significantly affects the propensity to 
migrate in a non-linear fashion. Specifically, the likelihood of migration rises until 
peaking in the age range of late twenties and early thirties, before falling as individuals 
grow older (Efendic, 2016; Germenji & Swinnen, 2005). Generally, the returns to 
education will be higher in more developed markets (Grogger & Hanson, 2011), so that 
the differential in expected earnings grows as human capital increases and education 
thus makes migration more attractive (Efendic, 2016). However, not all forms of human 
capital may transfer from home to destination labor markets. For instance, 
qualifications from one market may not be recognized in another, or if illegal or 
undocumented, migrants may be restricted to the informal economy and relatively 
unskilled jobs.  
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While neo-classical theory assumes that individuals possess a compensating 
differential (zi) in favor of remaining in their current location, its presence and strength 
varies across groups. For instance, in societies where women are expected to care for 
older relatives, maintain the family home and relocating alone is considered culturally 
unacceptable, the psychological costs of migration for women are likely to be high. In 
such cases, female migration may be limited to that instigated by marriage or following 
husbands abroad (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989), so that the determinants of migration 
differ significantly according to gender (Mendola & Carletto, 2009). This is evident in 
many predominantly Muslim societies, like Kosovo, but not all cases (Hondagneu-
Sotelo & Cranford, 2006). While generally it is assumed that zi takes a positive value, 
for young people in particular, there might be a desire to seek foreign adventures and 
experience different lifestyles (Arrehag, Sjöberg, & Sjöblom, 2006). So if the 
destination is perceived as socially more attractive, a negative earnings differential may 
be required to stop migration (Massey, et al., 1993). 
 
 
Household Characteristics 
 
In contrast to the neo-classical assumption of decision-making by individuals, the New 
Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) takes a household perspective (Stark, 1991; 
Stark & Bloom, 1985). NELM models assume that households jointly make migration 
decisions to increase income, obtain funds for investment, and insure against 
production and income risks in the face of market failures in credit and insurance 
markets (Taylor, 1999). The selection of who within the household migrates and for 
how long depends on their expected earning potential and ‘at home’ family 
commitments (Davis, Stecklov, & Winters, 2002; Massey, et al., 1993). 
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Regarding family structures, migration may be curtailed by marriage and the 
presence of dependent children. In some societies it may be socially unacceptable for a 
wife to leave the matrimonial home and / or the husband to leave his wife and children 
either at all or for any length of time (Fleury, 2016). Consistent with this, empirical 
analysis of German gastarbeiter reveals that the first waves of migrants were heavily 
biased toward unmarried males without dependent children and that the propensity to 
return home rose with having a spouse and children in the country of origin (Constant 
& Massey, 2002). For Albania, Germenji and Swinnen (2005) found that the presence 
of children in the household had a negative but insignificant effect on migration. 
 
The expected income differential � 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑖𝑖�, ceteris paribus, will be larger 
for poorer households, so that the motivation to migrate will be stronger for lower 
income groups. In contrast, wealthier households, as a result of the diminishing 
marginal utility of income, possess weaker incentives (Kotorri, 2010). However, 
migration involves direct costs such as transportation, documentation, upfront rent and, 
in some cases, bribes (c in equation 1). In the presence of imperfect credit markets and 
household budget constraints, poorer households may lack the financial means to meet 
the direct costs of migration (Arrehag, et al., 2006). This suggests that the impact of 
household income on migration is non-linear, with the propensity to migrate lowest for 
those from the very poorest and very richest households.  
 
Network effects 
 
Massey et al. (2010, p.317) define a migration network as a “set of interpersonal ties 
that link migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas 
through the bonds of kinship, friendship and shared community origin” and thus a form 
10 
 
of social capital. Migration networks can provide information on employment 
opportunities in destination markets, direct assistance in the form of housing, transport 
and food in the host environment, and reduce some of the social costs of migration 
(loneliness, psychological distance from one’s own culture etc.). Migration networks 
may thus lower the differential in favor of remaining in the current location (zi) as well 
as reducing the direct costs of migration and, through the identification of employment 
opportunities, increase the expected wage differential. Substantial empirical evidence 
exists that such networks facilitate migration (Davis, et al., 2002; McKenzie & 
Rapoport, 2007) with the strongest network bonds developing with other household 
members who are or were previously migrants (Fleury, 2016; Germenji & Swinnen, 
2005). 
 
 
Relative Deprivation 
 
The NELM posits that migration stems not only from a desire of households to improve 
their incomes in absolute terms but also to increase income relative to others. In other 
words, the marginal utility of income depends also on the income of others (Stark, 
1991), so that migration propensities will be positively correlated with the level of 
inequality in the origin community (Czaika & de Haas, 2012). As a result, migration 
from poor households will be greater if they live amongst richer, rather than equally 
poor, neighbors (Quinn, 2006). In this regard the origin community remains the focal 
reference group and such relative deprivation may explain why migrants accept 
employment that is “dangerous, dirty and demeaning” (Czaika & de Haas, 2012), which 
native workers refuse, if it raises their standing and socio-economic status in the origin 
community (Czaika, 2013). There is some, although far from universal, empirical 
evidence supporting the notion that migration and its length depends on a household’s 
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income relative to its reference group (origin municipality or village) rather than just 
absolute income levels (Quinn, 2006; Stampini, Carletto, & Davis, 2008; Stark, 1991). 
 
Security effects 
The greatest flows of migrants in history stemmed from wars, and in a post-conflict 
environment, on-going feelings of insecurity may prompt further migration (Ibáñez & 
Vélez, 2008; Morrison & May, 1994) or prevent return migration (Joireman, 2017). 
Insecurity may relate to personal safety or security of assets. Regarding the latter,  much 
attention has been paid to land registration and titling as a mechanism for securing 
property rights, particularly following regime change, such as after the downfall of state 
socialism in Central and Eastern Europe or separation from the former Yugoslavia as 
in the case of Kosovo (Hartvigsen, 2014; Todorovski, Zevenbergen, & van der Molen, 
2016). However, land registration may be insufficient to provide the security required 
for farming land effectively. For example, drawing on research in Bulgaria, 
Fredriksson, Bailey, Davidova, Gorton, and Traikova (2017) document cases of land 
abandonment following repeated theft of crops and / or equipment, or a neighboring 
farmer allowing his guard dogs to roam freely over the land of others. The lack of 
personal safety and security of property can devastate returns to farming activities and 
precipitate migration. 
 
 
 
Modelling and Data 
 
As the literature suggests that migrants self-select out of the general population non-
randomly (McKenzie & Rapoport, 2010), it is necessary to control for selection bias.  
We employ therefore a Heckman selection modelling approach to effectively control 
for potential selection bias with respect to the estimation of the propensity to migrate at 
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the individual level. The first stage of the model estimates whether a particular member 
of a household migrated or not during 2012, while the second stage considers the length 
of time the household member migrated in the previous year (expressed in months). We 
estimate determinants for the variation in the propensity to migrate and length of 
migration, considering gender related differences, as recommended by McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2007). Data for 2012 is enriched by observations on the same household in 
2008. This allows us to test, for example, if there is continuity in household members 
who are migrating in both years and the role of network effects (e.g. the importance of 
family members being absent in 2008 on migration in 2012). Beside migrant related 
characteristics, we test for the effect of household, as well as farm and network effects 
on migration. Following McKenzie and Rapoport (2010), we estimated the average 
level of migration for agricultural households in each municipality to capture the 
potential effect of community migration networks. 
 
We enrich our econometric models by considering the reasons, if applicable, 
why households left land fallow and did not engage in production, as these can relate 
to the decision to migrate. For instance, leaving land fallow because of a shortage of 
inputs indicates underdeveloped factor markets. In contrast, leaving land fallow 
because of a lack of security reflects different concerns and potential policy 
interventions. A bootstrap based re-sampling procedure ensures the robustness of our 
estimates. 
 
We expect that an individual’s decision to migrate or not is influenced by a 
multitude of factors: household related and personal characteristics, farm and 
production related conditions, security, community networks, and relative deprivation. 
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It is likely that, in these regards, the characteristics of migrants will differ from non-
migrants. Unobservable characteristics affecting the decision to migrate will be 
correlated with the unobservable characteristics affecting an individual’s length of 
migration. Selectivity bias would be present, therefore, if we were to draw inferences 
about the determinants of the length of migration in the previous year for all individuals 
based on the observed length of migration in the previous year for the subset which 
actually migrated. Heckman’s two-stage sample selection model copes with such a 
selection problem by assuming that two judgements are made with regard to migration 
and the length of migration (months of the previous year absent from the household), 
with each determined by a set of explanatory variables (Heckman, 1979). 
 
There are, hence, two latent dependent variables models, where the decision to 
migrate or not is modeled as a selection equation specified as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = �1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗ℎℎ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 + 𝑢𝑢 > 0𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 0 𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 �  [2] 
where iP  is a binary variable which takes the value one if the individual is a migrant 
and zero if the individual decided not to migrate, hh denotes the vector of household 
related and individual characteristics, net stands for social network effects, dep for 
factors related to relative economic deprivation. 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾, and 𝛿𝛿 are the parameters to be 
estimated, and u is the error term with the corresponding log-likelihood function for [2] 
given in Maddala (1998).  
The length of migration in the previous year equation is given by: 
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇 + ∑ 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚ℎℎ𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + ∑ 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 + ∑ 𝜔𝜔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 + ∑ 𝜖𝜖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞 + 𝑣𝑣𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚  [3] 
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where length is expressed in months, hh denotes again the vector of household related 
and individual characteristics, net stands for social network effects, dep for factors 
related to relative economic deprivation, and fal for the variables related to stated 
reasons to leave land fallow. 𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏,𝜑𝜑,𝜔𝜔, and 𝜖𝜖 are the parameters to be estimated, and v 
is the error term. We estimate [2] and [3] by following Heckman’s two-stage estimation 
procedure (1979) to address the potential selection bias. The first stage of the estimation 
procedure consists of estimating equation [2] as the migration equation. The second 
stage of the estimation procedure is the ordered probit equation of length of migration 
in the previous year which contains the inverse Mill’s ratio as a correcting term. 
 
To address the potential problem of heteroscedasticity, we estimate the robust 
covariance matrix using the Huber-White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 
1980). The latter provides consistent estimates of the covariance matrix for parameter 
estimates even when the fitted parametric model fails to hold because of 
misspecification or violation of the error related assumptions. Puhani (2000) 
demonstrated that the one-stage full-information ML estimation of the Heckman 
selection model is preferable in the case where collinearity problems are absent. 
Auxiliary regressions performed showed that some minor collinearity in the 
explanatory variables could be excluded. Hence, we prefer to apply a two-stage 
estimation procedure. To examine the validity of the final model specification, we test 
for the group wise insignificance of the parameters in [2] and [3] by a common 
generalized likelihood ratio testing procedure. Finally, a White (1980) test checked for 
possible heteroscedasticity. 
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Dataset 
 
Data employed in the study were extracted from agricultural household surveys 
conducted by the Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK) in 2008 and 2012.1 These unique 
datasets contain information on household characteristics (age, gender, education, and 
months absent from the household for each member), location, farming patterns (size 
of farm, number of plots, labor input, and production patterns), value of agricultural 
machinery and gross farm incomes. In 2012, 8.14% of male and 5.67% of female 
household members were migrants. The surveys did not collect information on the 
destination of migrants, however, so it is not possible in the analysis to distinguish 
between internal and international migration.  Data collection occurred face to face with 
the sample stratified by region and farm size to ensure its representativeness. For the 
purpose of the survey, SOK defined agricultural households as those that cultivate more 
than 0.10 ha of arable land or less than 0.10 ha of utilized arable land but had at least 
one cow or three pigs or five sheep/goats, or 50 poultry, or 20 beehives. Based on the 
theoretical and empirical evidence presented above, variables were selected for the 
empirical analysis (Table 1). Table 2 details the descriptive statistics. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
Results 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the econometric analysis. Column 1, outcome, 
shows the effect of the explanatory variables on the length of migration, i.e. the months 
in the previous year away from the household, and column 2, selection, shows the effect 
                                                            
1 During this period the statistical institution was called the Statistical Office of Kosovo. It is now known 
as Agjencia e Statistikave të Kosovës (Kosovo Agency of Statistics). 
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of the explanatory variables on the probability to be selected as a migrant in 2012. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the length 
of migration in the previous year and on the probability of being selected, respectively. 
Table 3 details the analysis for the full sample, with two sets of estimations presented 
which differ in terms of inclusion of variables relating to the reasons for land being left 
fallow. Table 4 presents the estimations for the sub-samples of male and female 
household members respectively, as the factors motivating migration may differ 
between the two groups (Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013). Considering the different 
diagnosis tests performed and measures of model quality, the estimated model 
specifications are statistically significant at a satisfactory level with no severe signs of 
misspecification.  
 
Tables 3 and 4 about here 
 
Model results identify the significance of household / personal characteristics, 
farm characteristics, and network effects in explaining variations in the selection and 
outcome variables. Considering both the propensity to migrate and length of migration 
in the previous year, for the full sample of respondents, the coefficients for age and age 
squared are significant and with differing signs. This is as expected - the likelihood of 
migration increases with age but only up to a certain point, after which it declines. On 
average, the tipping point is around 25 to 26 years of age ceteris paribus. The tipping 
point is, however, significantly different for men and women: between 31 and 32 years 
of age for men, but between only 15 and 16 years of age for female migrants (Graph 1). 
The low threshold for women suggests that they may move out as teenagers either to 
receive a better education or follow a relative / husband – a phenomenon observed in 
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some other low income countries (Kudo, 2015; Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989). In the last 
year of the so-called ‘upper secondary school’ in Kosovo, attended by 15 to 18 years 
old, 46.1 per cent are girls (UNICEF, 2013). 
 
Graph 1 about here 
 
Whilst the ratio of older people in the household (above 65 years of age) does 
not affect either the propensity to migrate or the length of migration, the ratio of children 
and young adults (up to 15 years of age) reduces the length of migration. For the full 
sample, it affects negatively the length of migration, and this holds for both male and 
female sub-samples at the 10 per cent level of significance. For men, having children 
also negatively affects the likelihood of migration, which mirrors results for Turkish 
gastarbeiter in Germany (Constant & Massey, 2002). It is also consistent with evidence 
for China, where migration becomes less likely as the number of pre-school children 
rises (Li & Zahniser, 2002) 
 
The likelihood of an individual migrating falls as gross income per household 
member rises but only up a certain point, after which rises in household income per 
capita positively affect the likelihood of migration (Graph 2). This suggests that 
migration may be motivated by desperation in the case of the poorest households and 
by greater opportunities for the wealthiest households, with those in the middle least 
inclined to migrate. On average, the tipping point in the model is around €3000 per 
capita per year ceteris paribus. For men this point is around €2600 to €2700 per capita 
per year with the equivalent figure for women of around €2500 to €2600 per capita. 
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When other factors are controlled for, women are significantly less likely to migrate 
than men.  
 
Graph 2 about here 
 
The propensity to be a migrant in 2012 was positively related to whether any 
other member of the household was a migrant in 2008 and the level of migration in the 
household’s locality (municipality) in 2008, but not, surprisingly, to whether the 
individual was a migrant in 2008. This pattern also holds for the length of migration in 
the previous year. The level of migration in the household’s municipality is a significant 
determinant for both male and female migration. Overall, the analysis underlines the 
importance of a household perspective for understanding migration, rather than 
focusing merely on individuals in isolation. It supports expectations based on the 
NELM about the role of migration networks (Davis, et al., 2002; McKenzie & 
Rapoport, 2007). The findings also support previous research on Kosovo, that the 
diaspora, enlarged by conflict and war, retain strong links with family members and 
local communities (Möllers, et al., 2017; Möllers, et al., 2013), which facilitates further 
migration. 
 
Most independent variables have a similar effect on the propensity of men and 
women to migrate, apart from education. The level of education achieved has a strong, 
negative effect on male migration but displays a positive sign for women. This holds 
for both the likelihood and length of migration in the previous year. This may reflect 
gender differences in the labor markets for migrants. Male migration is biased toward 
construction and physical work, while the public sector and office work is far more 
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common for women and requires a higher level of education (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 
2012). The size of the farm negatively influences the likelihood of migration in the case 
of men, but has no influence in the case of women. This again reflects labor market 
differences – men are more likely to be required to work on the labor-intensive family 
farm than women. 
 
Two variables, gross household income relative to the mean for the region and 
hectares of land per household member relative to the mean for the region, capture the 
effect of relative deprivation on migration. There is no strong support for the 
importance of either measure as a determinant of migration. Across the four models, 
these two variables are not significant, in any cases, at the 5 per cent level.  
 
Empirical results support the notion that an inability to cultivate a household’s 
farmland may stimulate migration. Land left fallow because of a farm household’s lack 
of inputs, manpower, equipment and poor economic profitability positively affect the 
propensity to migrate (Table 3). This echoes research for China, where poor farm 
profitability motivates out-migration (Li & Zahniser, 2002). However, land left fallow 
because of a lack of security negatively affects the likelihood of migration. This may 
reflect a belief that family members are required to stay on farm to ensure the security 
of property and other assets. While insecurity is thus often regarded as a ‘push’ factor 
(Huysmans, 2006), remaining on farm to preserve assets and protect other family 
members may inhibit migration, particularly whilst the memories of the armed 
conflicts, in which people lost their houses and land, are still fresh.  
 
Conclusions 
20 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of rural out-migration in Kosovo during the 
post-conflict era. To measure the determinants of rural out-migration, the analysis 
employed data from an agricultural household survey conducted at two points in time 
(2008 and 2012). Although the dependent variables were the propensity to migrate in 
2012, and for migrants, the length of migration in the previous year, several variables 
relating to 2008 reveal how past developments affected migration subsequently. 
 
The results support some of the key tenets of the NELM. Estimations underline 
the importance of taking a household perspective in studying migration. For instance, 
having another household member as a migrant in 2008 had a positive effect on both 
propensity to migrate and the length of migration of other household members in 2012. 
The study also reveals the importance of networks and social capital as pull factors. 
However, whilst the NELM hypothesizes a positive relationship between the propensity 
to migrate and relative deprivation in the origin community (Stark, 1991; Stark & 
Bloom, 1985), this study finds no supporting evidence, when measured in terms of both 
household and per capita incomes and farm size compared to regional means. In 
absolute terms, incomes have a non-linear effect on migration. Individuals from poorer 
and richer households have a higher propensity to migrate – at one end of the scale 
pushed by poverty, and at the other end pulled by opportunities to achieve better returns 
in more developed labor markets.  
  
Differences in the determinants of migration between men and women are, 
overall, fairly minor. One notable exception is the role of education. Whilst better 
educated men are less likely to migrate or stay longer away from the household, better 
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educated women are significantly more likely to migrate and migrate for longer. This 
reflects gender divisions in the nature of labor market opportunities. 
 
An important policy message of this study is that the main push factors for rural 
out-migration linked to farmland being left fallow are primarily economic. In the model 
that includes the reasons to leave land fallow, the variables that increase the propensity 
to migrate are a lack of inputs, manpower and equipment, and the lack of farm 
profitability. In contrast, insecurity leads to individuals staying on the farm. The 
intuition behind this result is that some people do not move off their farms in order to 
protect their families, houses and land. Given the relationships between the reasons for 
why land is left fallow and migration, the results suggest that policies seeking to 
decrease rural out-migration should focus on stimulating competitive input markets and 
devising strategies to improve farm profitability.   
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Table 1: Variables from the Farm Survey Selected / Computed for the Empirical Analysis 
Dependent variable Notes / a priori 
expectation 
Link with theory 
Whether individual i is a migrant in 2012 (first stage). 
Number of months migrant absent from household in the 
previous year (second stage) 
Heckmann  
Independent variables   
Household / personal characteristics   
Age of household member i Negative Young person has more years over which to recover the cost and receive the 
gains of migration 
Age squared of household member i Non-linear Very young and very old may not migrate – non-linear 
Gender Lower for females Females more tied to household for cultural reasons  
Level of education of household member i Positive Education (human capital) increase potential returns from migration 
Farm characteristics   
Total gross farm income per capita in 2008 Conflicting theory Lower incomes per household member increase incentives to migrate but low 
incomes may act as a barrier to financing migration (wealth effect) 
Farm income per capita squared in 2008 Non-linear Migration rates should first increase and then decrease with wealth  
Farm size (ha farmed in 2008) Negative  Migration means to overcome credit and liquidity constraints which will be less 
pressing where have higher agricultural asset base 
Total resale value of agricultural machinery in 2008 (euros) Negative  As above 
Network effects   
If member i was a migrant in 2008 Positive Migration network effect 
If any other member of household migrated in 2008 Positive As above 
Level of migration in municipality Positive As above 
Relative deprivation   
Total gross income of household in 2008 relative to mean 
for region 
Relatively deprived 
more likely to migrate 
Households send workers abroad not only to improve income in absolute terms, 
but also to increase income relative to other households, reducing their relative 
deprivation compared with some reference group 
Total farmed area (ha) per capita relative to regional mean 
(income figures may be unreliable) 
Relatively deprived 
more likely to migrate 
As above 
Total farmed area (ha) per capita relative to regional mean 
(income figures may be unreliable) 
Relatively deprived 
more likely to migrate 
As above 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables1 
Variable No of observations Mean St Dev Min Max 
Household / individual effects      
Household member number of months away in previous year 14570 0.800 2.972 0 12 
Age12 14570 31.409 20.530 0 99 
Age212 14570 1407.988 1599.184 0 9801 
Gender (1 male, 2 female)12 14567 1.464 0.499 1 2 
Education122 14567 3.666 2.059 1 9 
Gross income per capita12 13808 173.834 476.252 0 8378 
Gross income per capita2 13808 257018.100 2533771.000 0 70200000 
Ratio of household members up to 15 years old12 15481 0.240 0.228 0 0.9 
Ratio of household members over 6512 15481 0.081 0.167 0 1 
Hectares (ha) farmed08 14570 3.882 6.629 0.04 125 
      
Network effects      
Migrant in08 14570    0.085   0.279          0          1 
Other household member migrant08 14570    0.304    0.460          0          1 
Average migration level per household in municipality08 14570    2.835    4.111  0.05   15 
      
Relative deprivation       
Relative gross income per capita08  13808  173.834 476.252          0 8378 
Relative ha per household member08 14570    0.918    1.121   0.01   16 
      
Reasons to leave land fallow       
Lack of inputs08 15481    0.073    0.261          0          1 
Lack of manpower08 15481    0.024    0.155          0          1 
Lack of equipment08 15481     0.013    0.114          0          1 
Low economic profitability08 15481    0.069    0.254          0          1 
Lack of security08 15481    0.004    0.065          0 1 
1 Subscripts 08 and 12 refer to years 2008 and 2012respectively. 
2 The nine categories of education are 1 No education; 2 Some primary school; 3 Primary school completed; 4 Some secondary school; 5 Secondary school 
completed; 6 Some high school; 7 High school completed; 8 Some University study; 9 University completed.  
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Table 3: Heckman Selection Model for All Observations12 
Variable Reasons for leaving land fallow not included Reasons for leaving land fallow included    
Marginal effects 
  
Marginal effects  
Outcome (1) Selection (2) Outcome (3) Selection (4) Outcome (1) Selection (2) Outcome (3) Selection (4) 
Age12 0.177      
[0.0302]*** 
0.022 
[0.0047]*** 
0.035 
[0.0086]*** 
0.003 
[0.0006]*** 
0.192 
[0.0274]*** 
0.023 
[0.0047]*** 
0.034 
[0.0081]*** 
0.003 
[0.0006]*** 
Age212 -0.003 
[0.0005]*** 
-0.000 
[0.0001]*** 
-0.001 
[0.0001]*** 
-0.000 
[0.0000]*** 
-0.004 
[0.0004]*** 
-0.000 
[0.0001]*** 
-0.001 
[0.0002]*** 
-0.000 
[0.0000]*** 
Gender12 -0.915 
[0.2532]*** 
-0.168 
[0.0342]*** 
-0.182 
[0.0346]*** 
-0.022 
[0.0044]*** 
-0.359 
[0.2463] 
-0.170 
[0.0351]*** 
-0.063 
[0.0557] 
-0.022 
[0.0045]*** 
Education12 -0.150 
[0.0794]* 
-0.028 
[0.0103]*** 
-0.029 
[0.0149]** 
-0.004 
[0.0013***] 
-0.112 
[0.0759] 
-0.030 
[0.0108]*** 
-0.019 
[0.0157] 
-0.004 
[0.0014]** 
Gross income per 
capita08 
-0.002 
[0.0007]** 
-0.000 
[0.0001]*** 
-0.000 
[0.0001]** 
-0.000 
[0.0000]*** 
-0.002 
[0.0008]*** 
-0.000 
[0.0001]* 
-0.000 
[0.0002]** 
-0.000 
[0.0000]* 
Gross income per 
capita208 
0.000 
[0.0000]** 
0.000 
[0.0000]*** 
0.000 
[0.0000]** 
0.000 
[0.0000]*** 
0.000 
[0.0000]** 
0.000 
[0.0000]*** 
0.000 
[0.0000]* 
0.000 
[0.0000]*** 
Ratio of household 
members up to 15 
years old12 
-1.552 
[0.6501]** 
-0.108 
[0.0770] 
-0.309 
[0.1097]*** 
-0.014 
[0.0099] 
-0.897 
[0.7283] 
-0.149 
[0.0723]** 
-0.159 
[0.1541] 
-0.018 
[0.0095]** 
Ratio of household 
members over 6512 
-1.625 
[1.2519] 
0.118 
[0.1125] 
-0.324 
[0.2461] 
0.015 
[0.0145] 
-0.457 
[1.3306] 
0.155 
[0.1085] 
-0.081 
[0.2378] 
0.020 
[0.0144] 
Hectares (ha) 
farmed08 
 
-0.009 
[0.0053]* 
 
-0.001 
[0.0007]* 
 
-0.009 
[0.0059] 
 -0.001 
[0.0007] 
Migrant in08 -0.1177 
[0.3856] 
-0.011 
[0.0621] 
-0.023 
[0.0769] 
-0.001 
[0.0080] 
0.238 
[0.3855] 
-0.032 
[0.0663] 
0.042 
[0.0681] 
-0.004 
[0.0084] 
Other household 
member migrant08 
0.4774 
[0.2589]* 
0.074 
[0.0406]* 
0.095 
[0.0533]* 
0.010 
[0.0052]* 
0.371 
[0.2486]* 
0.079 
[0.0436]* 
0.066 
[0.0468] 
0.009 
[0.0055]* 
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Average migration 
level per household in 
municipality08 
0.233 
[0.0231]*** 
0.040 
[0.0035]*** 
0.046 
[0.0065]*** 
0.005 
[0.0005]*** 
0.246 
[0.0224]*** 
0.039 
[0.0034]*** 
0.044 
[0.0133]*** 
0.005 
[0.0004]*** 
Relative gross income 
per capita08 
0.109 
[0.1991] 
0.038 
[0.0220]* 
0.022 
[0.0397] 
0.005 
[0.0028]* 
0.353 
[0.2233]* 
0.021 
[0.0215] 
0.062 
[0.0445] 
0.003 
[0.0027] 
Relative ha per 
household member08 
-0.061 
[0.1899] 
-0.012 
[0.0260] 
-0.012 
[0.0375] 
-0.002 
[0.0033] 
-0.183 
[0.1927] 
-0.022 
[0.0293] 
-0.032 
[0.0368] 
-0.003 
[0.0036] 
Fallow due to lack of 
inputs08 
     
0.462 
[0.0618]*** 
 0.058 
[0.0078]*** 
Fallow due to lack of 
manpower08 
     
0.651 
[0.1014]*** 
 
0.083 
[0.0130]*** 
Fallow due to lack of 
equipment08 
     
0.369 
[0.1618]*** 
 
0.047 
[0.0204]** 
Fallow due to 
unprofitability08 
     
0.205 
[0.0673]*** 
 
0.026 
[0.0086]*** 
Fallow due to 
insecurity08 
     
-4.828 
[0.0879]*** 
 
-0.614 
[0.0204]*** 
Mill’s Ratio 
 
6.1467 
[0.3036]*** 
   
5.3763 
[0.3151]*** 
  
Rho 
 
1.000 
   
1.000 
  
Sigma  6.1467 
  
 5.3763 
  
Constant 
 
-1.360 
[0.0851]*** 
  
 -1.408 
[0.0935]*** 
  
Observations  13805 
  
 13805 
  
1 Subscripts 08 and 12 refer to 2008 and 2012. 
2 Standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 4: Heckman Selection Model according to Gender 
Variable Male only Female only    
Marginal effects 
  
Marginal effects  
Outcome (1) Selection (2) Outcome (3) Selection (4) Outcome (1) Selection (2) Outcome (3) Selection  
Age12 0.253 
[0.0369]*** 
0.035 
[0.0067]*** 
0.042 
[0.0091]*** 
0.005 
[0.0010]*** 
0.050 
[0.0423] 
0.010 
[0.0068] 
0.011 
[0.0099] 
0.001 
[0.0007] 
Age212 -0.004 
[0.0006]*** 
-0.001 
[0.0001]*** 
-0.001 
[0.0001]*** 
-0.000 
[0.0000]*** 
-0.001 
[0.0007]** 
-0.000 
[0.0001]*** 
-0.000 
[0.0002]** 
-0.000 
[0.0000]*** 
Education12 -0.404 
[0.116]*** 
-0.082 
[0.0145]*** 
-0.067 
[0.0282]*** 
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Ratio of household 
members up to 15 
years old12 
-1.285 
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-0.206 
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 -0.015 
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[0.0071] 
 
-0.000 
[0.0008] 
Migrant in08 -0.263 
[0.4871] 
-0.030 
[0.0831] 
-0.043 
[0.0812] 
-0.004 
[0.0121] 
0.134 
[0.5761] 
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Other household 
member migrant08 
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[0.0081] 
0.459 
[0.4201] 
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Average migration 
level per household in 
municipality08 
0.213 
[0.0257]*** 
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[0.0045]*** 
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[0.0105]*** 
0.006 
[0.0006]*** 
0.204 
[0.0374]*** 
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Relative gross income 
per capita08 
-0.164 
[0.2281] 
0.000 
[0.0324] 
-0.027 
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0.000 
[0.0047] 
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[0.0053] 
-0.249 
[0.3433] 
-0.067 
[0.0489] 
-0.053 
[0.0719] 
-0.007 
[0.0053] 
Mill’s Ratio  5.4599    5.7226 
  
Rho  1.0000    1.0000 
  
Sigma  5.4598    5.7226 
  
Constant  -1.5136 
[0.0967]*** 
   -1.720 
[0.1152]*** 
  
Observations  7388    6417 
  
1 Subscripts 08 and 12 refer to 2008 and 2012. 
2 Standard errors in brackets
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Graph 1: Marginal Probabilities and 95% Confidence Intervals for Migration by Age 
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Graph 2: Marginal Probabilities and 95% Confidence Intervals for Migration by Income 
 
 
